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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Shelaina

Neimeyer entered a conditional

Danyell

methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.
denial 0f her motion t0 suppress evidence and argues

motion, the

guilty

plea

She reserved the

on appeal

that, in its

t0

possession

of

right to appeal the

order denying that

improperly took judicial notice of a portion 0f the Twin Falls City

district court

Code.
Statement

Of The

The

Facts

And Course Of The

district court

made

Proceedings

the following ﬁndings 0f fact,

none of Which are challenged on

appeal:

On August
Comeau were

5,

2018

at

approximately 2:00 a.m., Ofﬁcers Thompson and

dispatched to conduct a welfare check in the parking lot of the

1509 Kimberly Road, in Twin Falls, Idaho. An
employee 0f the gas station had called the police about a car that had been parked
in the gas station’s parking lot for over an hour With a female occupant inside
Oasis gas station located

at

(Defendant).

The Defendant had not moved from

and had been

in the gas station earlier purchasing alcohol.

When

the vehicle for over a half hour

Ofﬁcers Thompson and Comeau arrived 0n scene their police

vehicles did not have their emergency lights 0n. Ofﬁcers

Thompson and Comeau

parked their vehicles several dozen feet behind the Defendant’s vehicle. The
ofﬁcers approached the Defendant’s vehicle with their ﬂashlights illuminated, but

Thompson approached the driver side
while Ofﬁcer Comeau approached on the

they did not draw their weapons. Ofﬁcer

window of

the Defendant’s vehicle

passenger side.

As Ofﬁcer Thompson approached

the

driver

side

Window 0f

the

Defendant’s vehicle he observed that the vehicle’s lights were on and that the key

was

in the ignition.

asked her

why

Ofﬁcer Thompson asked the Defendant for identiﬁcation and

she had been in the parking lot for so long. The Defendant

explained that she had purchased items for a friend

at the

gas station and had not

yet because she had been 0n the phone. Ofﬁcer Thompson asked if the
Defendant had been drinking and the Defendant responded that she had not been.
left

There was an alcoholic beverage can in the center console cup holder, but the

Defendant explained that the can was empty and was merely being used as an
ashtray. Ofﬁcer Thompson asked about the Defendant’s plans and if there was
anything the ofﬁcers could do for the Defendant. The Defendant responded that

she

was going

t0

go home and

The Defendant remarked

that

was nothing the ofﬁcers could d0 for her.
she wanted t0 throw away the can that was being

that there

used as an ashtray.

Ofﬁcer Comeau stated “there’s some Fireball right there.”
Ofﬁcer Comeau was referencing a bottle of alcohol located in the passenger area
0f the vehicle. The seal on the bottle had been broken and the bottle was only
partially full. The Defendant grabbed the bottle and moved it t0 the back seat 0f
the vehicle, remarking that she could now travel With the bottle stored 0n the back
seat. Ofﬁcer Thompson indicated that the Defendant was correct in stating that the

At

that time

bottle could

be transported closed in the back

seat.

Ofﬁcer Comeau then asked about a small black container located 0n the
seat. The Defendant stated that the container was empty and had
from years and years ago.” Ofﬁcer Comeau asked if
contained “ﬁlm and stuff
the Defendant could show the contents of the container t0 Ofﬁcer Thompson. The
Defendant protested by stating, “Do I really got to? I mean, I haven’t done
anything wrong.” Ofﬁcer Thompson responded by stating, “Well, we have alcohol
.” The Defendant then offered to “do a test,” Which this
in the vehicle now
Court takes to mean a sobriety test based 0n the context of the conversation.
.” at Which
Ofﬁcer Thomson [sic] then stated, “That’s ﬁne. What’s inside 0f the
point the Defendant opened the container and showed the contents t0 Ofﬁcer
Thompson.
Ofﬁcer Thompson stated in his afﬁdavit and at hearing that he
immediately smelled the odor 0f marijuana, Which he is familiar With through his
training and experience. When Ofﬁcer Thompson shined his ﬂashlight into the
container he also stated in his afﬁdavit and at hearing that he observed a green
leafy substance that he recognized as marijuana through his training and
experience as a police ofﬁcer. After opening the container quickly the Defendant
passenger

.

.

.

.

.

.

then closed the container and put

it

.

in her purse.

At that point, Ofﬁcer Thompson asked the Defendant to step out of the
vehicle. The Defendant did so, but took her purse with her. The Defendant was
placed in handcuffs. Ofﬁcer Thompson explained that the Defendant was being
detained because of the alcohol found in the vehicle, the possibility that she was
under the inﬂuence 0f something, and for the marijuana in the small container.
Ofﬁcer Thomson [sic] then searched the Defendant’s purse, in which he found the
black container, Which contained a glass end t0 a vape With green and brown
residue at the end. In addition, the purse contained small clear baggies containing

a green leafy substance Which Ofﬁcer

amount 0f

Thompson recognized

as marijuana, a small

pouch
containing a clear glass pipe with white and brown residue, which Ofﬁcer
Thompson suspected t0 be used t0 smoke methamphetamine. Also in the pouch
were two plastic baggies containing White residue, Which Ofﬁcer Thompson
recognized as methamphetamine, and a small gray pick, which Ofﬁcer Thompson
suspected t0 be used to clean residue out of pipes used in the smoking of
methamphetamine and marijuana.
the green leafy substance in the black container, and a zip

Ofﬁcer Thompson then informed the Defendant that she was under arrest
for possession of methamphetamine and the Defendant was transported by Ofﬁcer
Comeau to the Twin Falls County Jail for booking. Ofﬁcer Thompson stayed at
the scene to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle, so that the vehicle could
be towed. During the inventory search Ofﬁcer Thompson found a White case,
which contained a clear plastic baggie with white and brown particles inside.
Ofﬁcer Thompson placed the baggie into an evidence bag for later testing. After
the inventory of the vehicle was complete, the vehicle was turned over t0 the
towing company.
At the police station, Ofﬁcer Thompson used a NARK II testing kit on the
clear glass pipe and the baggie from the White case in the back seat 0f the vehicle.
Both items tested a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. Ofﬁcer

Thompson

also tested the green leafy substance in the black container with a

NARK II testing kit, Which tested a presumptive positive for marijuana.
were sent

A11 items

t0 the state lab for further testing.

56-581)

(R., pp.

The

state

paraphernalia.

charged Neimeyer With possession 0f methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug

(R., pp. 32-35.)

She ﬁled a motion

to suppress, arguing that the ofﬁcers lacked

probable cause to search the black container. (R., pp. 37-42.) Ofﬁcers
testiﬁed at the suppression hearing. Ofﬁcer

Code “6-2-6 under

intoxicants”

made

it

a

Thompson

Thompson and Comeau

testiﬁed, in part, that the

misdemeanor

for

Neimeyer

t0

The

in the passenger

state

argued

that, after the

Falls City

have an open container

0f alcohol in her vehicle and that he suspected a Violation 0f that ordinance.
p. 12, L. 7.)

Twin

(T12, p. 11, L.

25 —

ofﬁcers observed “an open bottle 0f Fireball Whisky”

compartment of the vehicle, they had probable cause

to believe a crime

had been

1

The encounter was captured 0n Ofﬁcer Thompson’s body—cam and the recording was admitted
at the suppression hearing as Exhibit 1. (TL, p. 8, L. 9 — p. 9, L. 3 (citations t0 “Tr.” are t0 the
transcript

of the hearing 0n Neimeyer’s motion t0 suppress, contained in the ﬁle

titled

“Shelaina

D. Neimeyer 10-30-18.pdf”).) That Video is in the record as “Thompsonmpg,” and will be
referred t0 as “EX. 1.” There are two additional body—cam Videos in the record, both from Ofﬁcer
Comeau’s body—cam—“Comeau 1.mpg” and “Comeau 2.mpg.” The state Will not refer t0 either

0f those

latter

two Videos.

committed because,
City

“[a]s

Ofﬁcer Thompson

6-2-6.” (Tr., p. 23, L. 25

Code

—

testiﬁed, that

p. 24, L. 21.)

is

In addition, the state argued,

Whether 0r not

for the ofﬁcers t0 investigate further t0 determine

the inﬂuence before releasing her back into the community.”

Twin

a misdemeanor under

this

it

Falls

was “proper

person was actually under

The

(TL, p. 24, Ls. 22-25.)

state

then argued that Neimeyer consensually opened the black container and showed the ofﬁcers

contents. (TL, p. 25, Ls. 1-23.)

search

.

.

When

.

she

is

Neimeyer argued

that the encounter

required to open that black

ﬁlm

canister.”

“morphs

into a seizure

its

and a

She

(TL, p. 26, Ls. 12-14.)

argued that she was “required” to open the container, the contents of which provided additional
cause t0 search the rest of the vehicle. (TL,

The
64.)

district court

p. 28, Ls. 10-24.)

(R., pp. 56-

issued a written decision denying the motion t0 suppress.

After making the factual ﬁndings quoted above, the court held that the encounter was

consensual and Neimeyer had voluntarily opened the container. (R., pp. 61-62.) The court noted
that ofﬁcers did not block

Neimeyer’s

car,

did not activate their emergency lights, did not display

any weapons, did not order Neimeyer out of the car
container,

and did not retain her identiﬁcation.

6-2-6—making

it

a

misdemeanor

t0 possess

until after they

(R., p. 61.)

It

observed the marijuana in the

then quoted

Twin

Falls City

Code

an open 0r unsealed container of alcohol in the

passenger compartment 0f a vehicle—and concluded that the ofﬁcers could have arrested
ordinance and could then have conducted a search incident t0

Neimeyer under

this

pp. 61-62.)

therefore concluded that “Ofﬁcer

It

Ofﬁcer Comeau had probable cause

Thompson’s comment implying

to [sic] arrest the

arrest.

that

(R.,

he and

Defendant and conduct a search was

accurate and did not render the consent of the Defendant in opening the container invalid.” (R.,

p. 62.)

Having observed the marijuana, the court concluded

what they did—arrest

her, search her,

that the ofﬁcers

were

entitled to

and perform an inventory search 0f the vehicle.

(Id.)

d0
In

the alternative, the court concluded that “if the initial search, the Defendant opening the small

black container, was not based on voluntary consent, the search would

still

be valid under the

inevitable discovery doctrine.” (Id.)

Neimeyer accepted a conditional plea agreement, reserving the
0f her motion t0 suppress

(R., pp. 76-77),

and entered a guilty plea

For possession 0f methamphetamine, she was sentenced
p. 93.)

right to appeal the denial

(ﬂ generally 12/10/18 Tr.2).

t0 six years

With three years ﬁxed.

For possession 0f marijuana and paraphernalia, she was sentenced

with credit for time served.

(Id.)

A11 sentences were to run concurrently.

to eighteen days each,

(Id.)

The

suspended execution and placed Neimeyer on probation for a period of four years.

Neimeyer timely ﬁled a notice of appeal.

2

(R.,

district court

(Id.)

(R., pp. 106-1 10.)

References to “12/10/18 Tr.” are t0 the transcript of the change of plea hearing, contained in a

ﬁle titled

“NEIMEYER

12-10-18.pdf.”

M
Neimeyer

Did the

states the issue

district court err

on appeal

When

it

as:

denied Ms. Neimeyer’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Neimeyer
suppress?

failed to establish that the district court erred in

denying her motion t0

ARGUMENT
Neimever Has Failed To Show The
A.

District

Court Erred In Denying Her Motion To Suppress

Introduction

The

district court

determined that Neimeyer voluntarily consented t0 the search 0f the

black container in which ofﬁcers discovered marijuana, which then led to the discovery 0f other
drugs and paraphernalia.
district court’s reliance

Neimeyer’s primary argument 0n appeal concerns the

(R., p. 62.)

on Twin

Falls City

open 0r unsealed container of alcohol

Code

§ 6-2-6,

in the passenger

making

it

misdemeanor

a

compartment of a vehicle.

to possess

(R., p. 61.)

After ofﬁcers asked if Neimeyer would open the black container, she responded,
really got to?

I

mean,

I

haven’t done anything wrong.” (R., p. 57; EX.

Thompson responded, “Well, we have
opened the container.

(Id.)

The

alcohol in the vehicle

district court

now

.

.

1,

.

02:45

—

,” after

an

“Do

I

03:08.) Ofﬁcer

which Neimeyer

determined that ofﬁcers had already seen an open

container of liquor in the passenger compartment 0f the vehicle and so Ofﬁcer

Thompson’s

m

response was an accurate and not misleading suggestion that Neimeyer had in fact done

something wrong and that they had probable cause t0

m,

145 Idaho 840, 848, 186 P.3d 696, 704 (Ct. App. 2008), the

just as, “if ofﬁcers

have probable cause

a warrant if consent

that

arrest her.

is

district court

concluded

that,

reﬁlsed does not Vitiate the suspect’s consent to search,” the implication

ofﬁcers had probable cause to believe

E

Citing

to obtain a warrant, telling a suspect that they will obtain

Neimeyer could be searched incident

(R., pp. 61-62.)

(R., p. 62.)

it

to

an arrest under the Twin Falls City Code, Where

had been violated, did not

Vitiate

Neimeyer’s consent.

also State V. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 779-80, 152 P.3d 645, 650-51 (Ct.

2006) (holding that an express or implied threat to make a lawful
to search coerced or involuntary).

arrest

App.

does not render consent

On

appeal,

Neimeyer argues

for the ﬁrst time that the state never

the city ordinance and the district court

She argues

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.)

that

Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented

was not permitted

to

proved the existence 0f

take judicial notice 0f

that, as a result, “the district court’s factual

t0 the search

it.

ﬁnding

0f the container was clearly erroneous,

because the ofﬁcers implied they had probable cause t0 arrest and search her without actually
having probable cause 0n

this

record t0 do so, Which helped render her consent involuntary.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) Notably, she does not argue that the district court erred even if

properly aware 0f the existence and content of

that

Twin

Falls City

Code

§ 6-2-6.

district court

was

Her argument

Ofﬁcer Thompson’s statement regarding alcohol having been observed

rendered her consent involuntary because the

it

is

in the vehicle

was not properly aware 0f

the city

ordinance. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)

This argument

fails for several reasons.

district court’s reliance

error, if any, is

the ordinance.

First,

Neimeyer did not object below

on the ordinance, has not addressed fundamental

Third, there

Finally,

was unobjected-to evidence below regarding

even

if

Neimeyer

judicial notice 0f the ordinance,

district court’s

0n review, and the

not fundamental. Second, the district court was entitled to take judicial notice of

content that supports the district court’s conclusion even if

ordinance.

error

t0 the

is

it

if there

was not

entitled to take

was n0 independent evidence

to support the

conclusion regarding the existence and content of the ordinance, the error

harmless because Ofﬁcer Thompson’s comment would

still

its

could not judicially notice the

correct that the district court

and even

the ordinance and

is

not have rendered Neimeyer’s

consent involuntary.
Finally, the district court held, in the alternative, that the evidence

been discovered even

if the allegedly

would

inevitably have

unlawful search 0f the black container had not occurred.

(R., p. 62.)

Neimeyer argues

that the district court

that that holding

was

error,

again relying primarily 0n her argument

was not appropriately made aware of Twin

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-19.)

The

district court correctly

determined

not consented t0 the search 0f the container, the ofﬁcers would

still

Falls City

that,

even

Code

§ 6-2-6.

if Neimeyer

had

have lawfully discovered the

evidence they did.

Standard

B.

Of Review

The standard of review 0f a suppression motion
motion
are

is

bifurcated.

When

to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

a decision on a

ﬁndings 0f fact that

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional

principles t0 those facts. State V. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,

“[W]hether a consent to a search was voluntary
review requires that

we

accept a

trial

is

an

issue, the

a question of fact and our standard of

court’s factual ﬁndings unless they are clearly erroneous.”

State V. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481,

Where voluntariness

is

456 (2004).

power

484

(Ct.

App. 2006). “In a suppression hearing

t0 assess the credibility

of the Witnesses, resolve any

conﬂicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences

is

vested in the

trial

court.” Ballou, 145 Idaho at 846, 186 P.3d at 702.

C.

Neimever Did Not Obiect Below T0 The District Court’s Determination To Take Judicial
Notice Of The Twin Falls City Code, Has Not Argued For Fundamental Error, And Any
Error Was Not Fundamental

A

claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection

considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.” State

233 P.3d 190, 196
authority t0

remedy

(Ct.

App. 2010).

may

only be

Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265,

V.

In the absence 0f an objection “the appellate court’s

that error is strictly circumscribed t0 cases

Where the

error results in the

defendant being deprived 0f his or her Fourteenth
fair tribunal.”

State V.

objection Will not

unwaived

lie

Peg,

Amendment due process

150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).

unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that “one 0r

constitutional rights

right to a fair trial in a

were violated”;

Review without

more of the defendant’s

(2) the constitutional error is “clear or

obvious” 0n

the record, “without the need for any additional information” including information “as to

Whether the

failure to object

was a

tactical decision”;

and

that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights”

the error “affected the

outcome of the

trial

Neimeyer never objected below

objection from Neimeyer.

(Tr., p.

by showing a reasonable

probability that

court proceedings.” Li. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

on the Twin

t0 the district court’s reliance

Ofﬁcer Thompson testiﬁed regarding

Code.

“defendant must demonstrate

(3) the

its

12, Ls. 2-7.)

Falls City

content at the suppression hearing with no

The prosecutor

cited

it

and argued

that the

ofﬁcers had probable cause t0 arrest Neimeyer under that section with n0 objection from

Neimeyer. (TL,

p. 23, L.

25 —

p. 24, L. 21.)

The

district court cited, quoted,

and relied 0n

it

in

its

order denying Neimeyer’s motion to suppress (R., pp. 61-62), and Neimeyer did not ﬁle any
objection or express any concern about

it

doing

so.

ﬂ

I.R.E. 201(6) (providing that if “the court

takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, 0n request,

Though

the

Twin

Neimeyer did not

Falls City

raise

Code was obviously an

any concerns regarding the

and should have raised her concerns about the
issued

its

issue,

state’s reliance

The

entitled t0

be heard”).

issue at the suppression hearing

0n

district court’s reliance

order denying her motion to suppress.

and resolved the

is still

district court

it

and

then, she certainly could

on

it

after the district court

then could have considered

and the prosecutor could have submitted a certiﬁed copy of the code as

Neimeyer claims was necessary.
requirement that the defendant

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

make an

objection below

10

is

The preservation doctrine and

its

designed to prevent exactly such

State V. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 784, 241 P.3d 955,

sandbagging.

contemporaneous objection prevents the
silent

litigant

from sandbagging the

about his objection and belatedly raising the error only

favor.” (internal quotation

marks and

957 (2010) (“Requiring a

alterations omitted)).

if the

E

court,

i.e.,

remaining

case does not conclude in his

also City of Lewiston V. Frarv,

91 Idaho 322, 328, 420 P.2d 805, 811 (1966) (holding that argument on appeal that district court

erred

by taking

was waived by

judicial notice 0f city ordinance

failing t0 raise the issue t0 the

district court).

Neimeyer does not argue 0n appeal
taking judicial notice of the ordinance.

court committed fundamental error.

E

that the district court

committed fundamental error by

She has therefore waived any argument
State V. Baxter, 163 Idaho 23

1,

that the district

236, 409 P.3d 81

1,

816

(2018) (holding that argument regarding unobjected-to error was “futile” where appellant had
“not argued for ﬁmdamental error review”); State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

970 (1996) (“When issues 0n appeal are not supported by propositions 0f law,

authority, or

argument, they will not be considered”).

Even
address

it

unwaived

if

she had not waived any argument regarding fundamental error by failing t0

0n appeal, there

is

constitutional right.

section 9-101

by taking

no fundamental

error here.

Neimeyer argues

First,

any error did not Violate an

that the district court violated Idaho

judicial notice of a fact not listed in that statute

12-13), and the determination to take judicial notice

is

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

“evidentiary in nature” and discretionary.

Fortin V. State, 160 Idaho 437, 442, 374 P.3d 600, 605 (Ct. App. 2016).

evidentiary, discretionary,

and involves only the alleged Violation 0f a

not implicate a constitutional right and fundamental error review.

The alleged

statute,

E

Idaho 477, 496, 399 P.3d 804, 823 (2017) (holding that an error that

11

Code

error is

and therefore does

State V. Lankford, 162

is

merely evidentiary or

statutory does not implicate constitutional rights or fundamental error); State V. Kenner, 121

Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (“[A]n abuse 0f discretion by a
constitute

ﬁmdamental

error.”)

Second, the alleged error

record” and “the record [does not]

the

that

disclose[]

is

Had Neimeyer

error suggests that

Neimeyer had a

failure

to

was

object

does not support the

deemed

appropriate.

district court’s

the district court to do so.

By

would not

clearly not

_, 447 P.3d 949, 957 (2019).

strategic reason not t0 object below.

objected, the district court could have ensured that the ordinance

a manner that Neimeyer

court

not “clear and obvious from the

a strategic or tactical decision.” State V. Medina, 165 Idaho 501,

The nature of the alleged

trial

Neimeyer has never suggested

was admitted

in

that the ordinance

conclusion and, so, her attorney had n0 incentive to prompt

failing t0 object,

Neimeyer could

try her

hand

at

an appeal,

attempting exactly the sort 0f sandbagging that the preservation rules are designed to prevent.

Finally, the alleged error did not affect

irregularity that could

any substantial

have been easily rectiﬁed.

rights.

My,

It

was

at best a

minor, procedural

91 Idaho at 328, 420 P.2d at 811

(holding that though district court did not err in taking judicial notice of ordinance, any error

a “mere irregularity” that

was waived by

was

failing t0 object below). In addition, for reasons

discussed below, the district court properly denied Neimeyer’s motion to suppress even if it was

not permitted t0 judicially notice the ordinance. Neimeyer could not establish fundamental error

even

if

she had not waived the argument by failing to address

it

in her

opening

brief.

Because Neimeyer did not object below, the alleged error can be reviewable only for
fundamental

argument

error.

that there

Because she has not addressed

was fundamental

error here.

the district court committed fundamental error.

12

that standard

Even

if

0n appeal, she has waived any

she had not, she cannot establish that

The

D.

Court

District

Was

Entitled

Neimeyer’s argument that the
0f an ordinance in effect in a city in

To Take

Of The Twin Falls

Judicial Notice

district court

its territorial

abused

discretion

its

jurisdiction also fails

CitV

Code

by taking judicial notice

0n the

merits.

E

m

M,

164 Idaho 407, 413, 431 P.3d 242, 248 (2018) (“Because the ruling [taking judicial

notice]

an evidentiary one, an abuse of discretion standard

is

Idaho Code section 9-101,

titled

is

established

by law,” “Public and

and judicial departments of this
other things.

LC.

According

§ 9-101.

meaning of “English words and phrases,”

private ofﬁcial acts 0f the legislative, executive

and of the United

state

appropriate.”).

“Facts judicially noticed,” provides that “Courts take

judicial notice of the following facts,” including the

“Whatever

is

t0

States,”

Neimeyer, the

and “The laws of nature,” among

district court erred

because municipal

ordinances are not listed therein. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) But the plain language of this statute
provides that

it lists

judicially noticed.

the “[f]acts judicially noticed” as a matter 0f law, not

E My,

101 “is not exclusive and

knowledge

are not

the courts”);

69,

ﬂ

Lowery

764 P.2d 431, 436

county ordinances”).

(Ct.

The

it is

(list

V.

statute, yet universally

district court

that

“we can

here properly exercised

for

Ada

0f law under LC.

take judicial notice of city and

its

discretion t0 judicially notice

is

this result is required

by Marcher

exclusive.

was one of the

§ 9-101.

Ignoring the plain language of the statute, Neimeyer argues that the
noticed in LC. § 9-101

common

County, 115 Idaho 64,

a separate and irrelevant question Whether the ordinance

facts that are judicially noticed as a matter

§ 9-

such facts are judicially noticed by

Board 0f County Commissioners

App. 1988) (noting

may be

0f facts noticed in LC.

not one 0f limitation” and pointing out that “[f]acts of

mentioned in the

also

the city ordinance;

is

91 Idaho at 325, 420 P.2d at 808

all facts that

list

0f facts judicially

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) Speciﬁcally, she argues that

V. Butler,

113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988).

13

(Id.) In

MLcher,
plaintiff

the issue

who

was Whether

the district court properly granted

claimed that a property owner was negligent for failing to

stairway from Which the plaintiff

MLcher, 113 Idaho

fell.

the plaintiff argued that the court erred

handrails.

at

at 868,

against a

install a handrail

749 P.2d

487.

at

On

The Idaho Supreme Court held

that “the failure

489. The ﬁrst reason for this holding

facts

was

of the

trial

0f this case was not error.”

Li. at 870,

that the plaintiff s only request for notice

“ofﬂ1and mention of building codes was insufﬁcient t0 put the

may

appeal,

court to take judicial notice

passing reference t0 “a Violation of the Blaine County Building Code” in a brief.

The Court then

on a

by not taking judicial notice 0f a building code requiring

0f the municipal ordinances implicated by the
P.2d

summary judgment

was a
The

court 0n notice of them.” Li.

trial

be some authority for the proposition

stated, “Further, there appears t0

Li.

749

that courts

not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances.” Li. The Court cited LC. § 9-101, noted

that the statute only included legislative acts,

and reasoned

that “it follows that the court

take judicial notice 0f city ordinances 0r 0f the various codes adopted under them.

must be proved.”

Li. (citing

The language
conclude that a court

relied

People

V.

Buchanan,

upon by Neimeyer

may never take judicial

1

may not

Such matters

Idaho 681, 684 (Idaho Tern, 1878)).

is dicta.

It

was not necessary

for the Court t0

notice 0f an ordinance in order to hold that the court

did not err in that case, given that the plaintiff had never actually requested the court t0 take

notice. In addition, the

Supreme Court reached
district court

was

jurisdiction.

My,

Marcher court did not mention the
the conclusion that the

list

My opinion

in section 9-101

in

Which the Idaho

was not exclusive and

entitled to judicially notice a municipal ordinance in the court’s

91 Idaho at 325, 328, 420 P.2d at 808, 81

consider the language 0f the statute, and

it

introduced

its

Nor

territorial

did the Court in Marcher

analysis with the qualiﬁer that “there

appears t0 be some authority for the proposition that courts

14

1.

own

that a

may

not take judicial notice of

MLcher, 113 Idaho

municipal ordinances.”
in

MLcher indicates

at

870, 749 P.2d at 489.

that its holding that the court did not err

by

In short, nothing

failing to take judicial notice

of

an ordinance was intended t0 bar any taking of judicial notice of an ordinance and overrule,
without mentioning, previous case law t0 the contrary. The plain language 0f the statute shows
that the facts

facts

may be

statute

may be judicially noticed,

But even on the assumption
about Which a

that I.C. § 9-101 is intended to provide

may

district court

19 Idaho 566, 114 P.

1

(191

1),

0f a local ordinance. In State

the Idaho

Supreme Court determined
it

had

established

§ 9-101(2),

by law.”

Li. at

Li. at

_,

114

P. at 3.

As

resort for

Codes 0f Idaho
“it

§

its

5950

aid to appropriate

(8) (1908)

of, inter alia, ‘the

at

LC.

for the court, if

had been favorable

Schmitz,

had adopted a

114

The

P. at 4.

t0 the organization

0f the

.

.

laws 0f nature, the measure 0f
In all these cases the

Li. (quoting

Rev.

The Court recognized

§ 9-101(8))).

that

of the county t0 ascertain Whether 0r not
district

‘laws of nature and the political history 0f the world.”’

15

.

he had to take notice 0f the adoption 0f the

local option statute in a county, t0 resort to the records

the vote

_,

books or documents of reference.”

(now codiﬁed

would not be any more difﬁcult

of

the Court noted, the statute

time, and the geographical divisions and political history of the world.

may

V.

providing that courts “take judicial notice 0f

provides “that courts Will take judicial notice

court

list

that a district court could

territorial jurisdiction

“local option statute,” prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors.

is

an exclusive

take judicial notice, Courts in Idaho have applied that

take judicial notice of Whether the county in which

Court did so by applying LC.

not

is

MLcher notwithstanding.

dicta in

statute t0 permit a district court to take judicial notice

[W]hatever

does not address what

Within the discretion of the court to judicially notice. Thus, the statute

exclusive 0f facts that

facts

0f law. The

are already noticed as a matter

it lists

Li.

than

it

“At any

would be
rate,

it

to ascertain the

would not be any

more

difﬁcult for

and although

it is

who

for the citizen

lives

75 or 100 miles from the county

courts, as such, are not required to take notice

in the application

jurisdiction

him than

0f all things they

know what

0f the law they ought to be required to

Where they are administering the laws.”

Li. at

_,

know

seat,

men,

as

still

the laws are 0f the

114 P.

at 3-4.

The Court

therefore adopted the “rational and sensible rule” and permitted the district court to take judicial

notice of laws passed within their territorial jurisdiction as facts “established

114

by law.”

_,

Li. at

P. at 3-4.

Later decisions also support the conclusion that a district court can take judicial notice of

municipal ordinances. In State

V.

Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 195 P.3d 745

of Appeals examined the very argument Neimeyer

and “conclude[d]

is

making

dicta

as having altered or overruled sub silentio the rule established

City ofLewiston,” that LC. § 9-101

is

reasonably in dispute because
court, 0r is capable

it is

by

generally

It

then held

known

that, “If

Within the

Marcher and

m

and should not be considered

the Court’s earlier decision in

not exclusive and district courts

local ordinances. Li. at 389, 195 P.3d at 748.

App. 2008), the Court

here, discussed

Marcher was

that the Court’s discussion in

(Ct.

may take judicial

notice of

an ordinance’s existence

territorial jurisdiction

is

of the

not

trial

of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources Whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned, then

it

may be

accepted as evidence by judicial notice, whether

requested or not and at any time in the proceeding.” Li. Though the court relied 0n I.R.E. 201,

and not LC.

§ 9-101,

it

was unambiguous

that

it is

not error for a district court to take judicial

notice 0f an ordinance enacted within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.

happened

here.

Marcher stands

Further,

it

explicitly rejected the proposition,

for the proposition that

LC.

§

9-101

is

is

precisely

what

advanced by Neimeyer here,

that

a limiting statute that prohibits the district

court from taking judicial notice 0f any facts not listed therein.

16

That

Finally, the contrary

previously held that courts
for example: the

View would lead

may

t0 absurd results.

Idaho appellate courts have

take judicial notice or have themselves taken judicial notice 0f,

number of votes

cast for the parties in an election, In

Re Contest of Election

(primary election-Republican nomination) for State Representative in Legislative Dist. N0.

7,

Position “B”, 164 Idaho 102, 106, 425 P.3d 1245, 1249 (2018); the fact that “auctions are not

Wakelam V. Hagood,

quiet affairs,”

price index,

0f other

Trautman

states,

White

V. Hill,

V.

151 Idaho 688, 692, 263 P.3d 742, 746 (201

116 Idaho 337, 340, 775 P.2d 651, 654

(Ct.

1);

the

consumer

App. 1989); the laws

White, 94 Idaho 26, 30, 480 P.2d 872, 876 (1971); the percentage

population increase in Chubbuck since 1960, Oregon Shortline R. C0. V. City of Chubbuck, 93

Idaho 815, 817, 474 P.2d 244, 246 (1970); water ﬂows, Application of Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 162,

248 P.2d 540, 546 (1952); and the

fact that horses unfamiliar

with one another “frequently ﬁght

When brought

into close contact,”

876 (1927).

But, according to Neimeyer, a district court cannot take judicial notice of an

ordinance adopted in a city within

Cooper

V.

Oregon Short Line R. Co., 45 Idaho 313, 262

its territorial

P. 873,

jurisdiction.

Idaho Code § 9-101 provides that certain facts are judicially noticed as a matter 0f law.

Even

if

laws 0f local governments

does not prohibit a

district court

may

not be similarly noticed as a matter 0f law, the statute

from taking judicial notice 0f them.

discretion, judicially notice ordinances passed

jurisdiction.

Neimeyer has

failed t0

judicial notice 0f Twin Fall City

show

Code

by

local

governments Within the court’s

that the district court

§ 6-2-6.

17

A district court may,

abused

its

discretion

at its

territorial

by taking

Even

E.

If

The

Of The

Court Erred In Taking Judicial Notice

District

Unobiected-To Testimony Supported

Misdemeanor To Possess

An Open

Its

Ordinance,

Made

Conclusion That The Ordinance

Container

Of Alcohol

In

It

A

The Passenger Compartment

Of A Vehicle
The
Within

its

district court

did not err by taking judicial notice of an ordinance adopted by a city

Even

territorial jurisdiction.

if

it

did, though,

independent evidence supported

its

conclusion that ofﬁcers had probable cause t0 believe Neimeyer committed a misdemeanor by
Violating

Twin

Falls City

Code

So, even if the Court looks past Neimeiyer’s failure to

§ 6-2-6.

object and reaches the merits of the district court’s determination t0 take judicial notice 0f the

and even

statute,

if

it

determines that the

This Court does not reverse

harmless.

if

district court

an error

is

was not

entitled t0

d0

harmless, and an “error

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same Without the error.”

so,

is

any error was

harmless

if the

State V. Almaraz, 154 Idaho

584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013).

Below, Ofﬁcer Thompson testiﬁed that Twin Falls City Code

misdemeanor
7.)

for

Neimeyer

Both ofﬁcers testiﬁed

vehicle.

(TL, p.

Neimeyer

9, L.

explicitly

After Ofﬁcer

18

have an open container of alcohol in the vehicle.

t0

that there

—

was an open

acknowledged

that the bottle

how

—

p. 10, L. 9.)

—

it’s

—

12

of liquor was where

it

did.

Code made

it

a

misdemeanor

Neimeyer did not object

t0

for

if the district court

Neimeyer

any of

t0

it?

was not

p. 22, L. 8.)

it

t0 the

In fact,

back 0f the

Yeah.” (EX.

1,

02:25

entitled to take judicial

Twin

Falls

have the open container 0f alcohol where she

that evidence below, does not argue

18

a

(Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-

notice of the ordinance, that evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that the

City

it

should not have been.

Neimeyer moved

supposed to be, right? To travel with

Even

made

6-2-6

0f liquor in the front seat 0f Neimeyer’s

the bottle in the front seat,

vehicle and stated, “that’s

02:37; T11, p. 9, L. 18

bottle

p. 10, L. 10; p. 19, Ls. 10-15; p. 21, L.

Comeau noted

§

0n appeal

that the

evidence was inadmissible, and does not argue that

competent evidence to support the

district court’s

under the ordinance. Therefore, even

Twin

Falls City

it

does not constitute substantial and

conclusion that she could have been arrested

if the district court

erroneously took judicial notice of the

Code, substantial and competent evidence supported

its

conclusion and any error

was harmless.

F.

Even
Falls

The District Court Was Not Entitled T0 Draw AnV Inferences Regarding Twin
City Code 6-2-6, The Error Was Harmless
If

Even supposing
City

Code

§

that there

6-2-6 and the district court could not take judicial notice of

error for the district court to cite

that

was n0 evidence 0f the existence and content of the Twin

and rely 0n

Neimeyer voluntarily consented
Neimeyer’s argument

that there

Even

t0 the contrary relies

lied to or

on a

fallacious inference

Twin

representation

163

P.3d

voluntariness.’”

Code

§ 6-2-6 t0

misled Neimeyer by suggesting that she could
relies

1194 (2007), for the proposition that “‘a

by police regarding

harmless

from the proposition

Falls City

be arrested for having an open container of alcohol in the vehicle. She
144 Idaho 482,

still

then, the district court properly determined

the existence 0r content of

Ofﬁcer Thompson

was

View the contents 0f the black container.

to let ofﬁcers

was n0 evidence regarding

the proposition that

it.

it, it

Falls

on

false

State V. Smith,

0r erroneous

the right to obtain a warrant weighs against a ﬁnding 0f

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (quoting Sm_ith, 144 Idaho at 489, 163 P.3d at 1201).)

But, even on the assumption that the district court did not have substantial and competent

evidence regarding the existence and content 0f Twin Falls City Code
judicial notice of it, there is

no evidence here

representations t0 Neimeyer.

that

Ofﬁcer Thompson made any

The testimony below

established, at a bare

ofﬁcers believed Neimeyer had violated a provision of the

19

§ 6-2-6,

Twin

Falls City

and could not take
false 0r erroneous

minimum,

that the

Code and had thereby

committed a misdemeanor. Neimeyer did not respond

no such ordinance or

that she

had not violated

to that testimony

by arguing

that there

was

In fact, as discussed above, she appeared to

it.

concede When interacting with the ofﬁcers that she knew the bottle of alcohol was Where
should not have been.

Thompson made

But, at any rate, the record

that reason

Neimeyer

at

turns her focus t0 the next sentence of Sm_ith:

may render

“‘Baseless threats t0 obtain a search warrant

489, 163 P.3d

Ofﬁcer

a false or erroneous representation.

Presumably for

at

entirely devoid 0f evidence that

is

it

1201 (quoting United States

V.

consent involuntary.” Sm_ith, 144 Idaho

White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992)).

According to Neimeyer, the implication by Ofﬁcer Thompson that she had violated an ordinance
in the

Twin

Falls City

Code was

“baseless in the record.”

focusing on that sentence provides no help.

View

That sentence

that false or erroneous representations

alternative t0

it.

In addition t0 the fact that

it

is

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)

But

only a further articulation of the

by police may weigh

against voluntariness, not an

follows directly 0n the heels 0f the claim that false

0r erroneous representations weigh against voluntariness, with no further articulation 0f what the

Court meant by ‘baseless’,

makes
bad

m,

the Seventh Circuit case that the Court in Sm_ith

clear that a threat is “baseless”

faith

m,

and with no grounds. In

Sm_ith, the court

went 0n

t0 say,

When

“When

there

after

is

a showing that the ofﬁcer

making

at 542.

0r warrant

The Seventh

Circuit

was evidence

that the ofﬁcer

made

the threat in

the expressed intention t0 obtain a warrant

it

does not

was focused not on whether

was adequately reﬂected

made

in the record at a

quoting,

the claim about baseless threats quoted in

however, and not merely a pretext t0 induce submission,
F.2d

was

motion

the threat as a pretext and

Vitiate consent.”

is

genuine,

m,

979

the ground for a threatened arrest

t0 suppress, but

0n Whether there

was not “genuine.”

Li. Indeed, the

Seventh Circuit immediately went 0n to reject the argument that the defendant’s consent in that

20

the court found that “n0 evidence

was involuntary because

case

Li Likewise,

intended to coerce Elaina by empty threat.”

there

was shown
is

that the police

no evidence here

ofﬁcers intended t0 coerce Neimeyer by empty threat or that the threat was not genuine.
State V.

Abeﬂa, 131 Idaho 704, 709, 963 P.2d 387, 392

against voluntariness if there

is

(Ct.

App. 1998) (noting

that

that the

ﬂ
it

211$

counts

evidence that the police “falsely 0r erroneously state[d]” that the

search could be accomplished by other, lawﬁJI means” (emphasis in original)).
Finally, Idaho

Code

section

23-5050) likewise makes

it

a

misdemeanor

an

t0 transport

unsealed container of alcohol in the passenger compartment 0f Neimeyer’s vehicle. Though the
ofﬁcers did not speciﬁcally identify that statute as providing a basis to

m

Devenpeck

V.

Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (probable cause

focusing on the facts

known

to the ofﬁcer, not

Even 0n Neimeyer’s understanding 0f the term
facts

were presented

arrest

at the

Neimeyer was not

The

district

on the

arrest,

is

it

clearly did so.

an objective inquiry

particular statute the ofﬁcer

‘baseless,’ the facts

known

to the ofﬁcers,

court correctly concluded that, under the totality 0f the circumstances,

t0 let ofﬁcers

Consent

is

valid if

it is

free

225-26. The voluntariness of an individual’s consent
the totality 0f the circumstances.

(citing

Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

duress or coercion.

at

is

V.

Amendment.

Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69

and voluntary. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

at

a question of fact to be determined based

State V. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852,

248-49).

A

View the contents of the black container.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State

P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).

upon

which

baseless.

warrantless search conducted pursuant t0 valid consent does not Violate the Fourth

V.

in mind).

suppression hearing, imply that Ofﬁcer Thompson’s alleged threat to

Neimeyer voluntarily consented

Schneckloth

had

26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001)

In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of

Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

at

248.
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The mere presence of ofﬁcers asking

for

consent to search

coercion.

E

is

United States

simply because one
t0 the search

not sufﬁcient, as a matter 0f law, t0 constitute improper police duress 0r

is

Nor

Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).

V.

is

voluntariness “impaired

faced with two unpleasant choices” such as “choosing between consenting

and allowing [contraband]

t0

be discovered and not consenting and risking

0r “consenting t0 a search 0r having his premises searched pursuant to a warrant.”

Idaho

at

779, 152 P.3d at 650, quoted

i_n

State V. Haynes, 159 Idaho 36, 50,

arrest”

Garcia, 143

355 P.3d 1266, 1280

(2015).

As

the district court found, prior to

Neimeyer consenting

the container, the ofﬁcers did not activate their

emergency

to let

them View

the contents of

lights or sirens, they did not

park close

behind Neimeyer 0r block her vehicle from leaving, they did not draw their weapons, they did not
ask Neimeyer to exit her vehicle, they did not apply any physical force, they did not

could not leave, and they did not retain her identiﬁcation.

(R., p. 61.)

tell

her she

They did nothing more

than ask Neimeyer questions over a short period 0f time, roughly two and a half minutes. (EX.

00:47 — 03:05.)

When

responded by asking
(EX.

1,

asked

if

she would

show them what was

02:50-02:57.) Ofﬁcer

Thompson

did not respond by telling her that she had to

the contents of the container, but instead simply noted that she

this as

bottle

an implicit threat t0

was making an

of alcohol in the vehicle.

arrest her for that offense,

implicit threat as

that

Neimeyer had

was

telling

in fact

Neimeyer

that

in the black container, she

“got t0” and by asserting that she had not “done anything wrong.”

if she’s

by possessing an open

1,

opposed

it is

in fact

Though

done something wrong

the district court interpreted

not even clear that Ofﬁcer

to simply noting, contrary t0

done something wrong.
he would

(Id.)

had

Thompson

what she had just

But, even assuming that Ofﬁcer

arrest her if she did not let

show them

them View

asserted,

Thompson

the contents 0f the

black container, there was no evidence that the threat was a pre-text or that the ofﬁcers were

22

lying to or misleading Neimeyer.

believed she had violated the
violated LC. § 23-5050).

Twin

Code

Falls

regarding

its

§

Twin

That

is

Ofﬁcer Thompson

Instead, the evidence suggested that

Falls City

Code

and, though he did not cite

6-2-6 and even if the evidence did not permit the court t0 draw inferences

content.

district court held, in the alternative, that “if the initial search, the

The

the small black container,

was not based on voluntary

under the inevitable discovery doctrine.”
holding

error “because the State never

is

that she

so even if the district court could not take judicial notice of

Neimever Has Not Shown That The District Court Erred BV Holding,
That The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Applies

G.

it,

consent, the search

Neimeyer argues

(R., p. 62.)

In

The

Alternative,

Defendant opening

would

still

be valid

that this alternative

proved the existence of section 6-2-6, the

district court

could not properly determine that Ms. Neimeyer violated the city ordinance. Thus, 0n this record,

it

cannot be said that the arrest and search for Violating section 6-2-6 would have been a lawﬁJI

action.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)

As

discussed above, however, that argument

fails for

a

variety of reasons.3

Next, Neimeyer claims that the

would have been
But the

arrested under

district court

that ordinance

container.

and

Twin

held that Ofﬁcer

Falls City

did not

Code

make an adequate ﬁnding

§ 6-2-6.

if

she did not

In effect, the court found that

show him

t0 arrest

The

state

concedes that

that ofﬁcers

LC.

§

had a basis

if this

t0

Ofﬁcer Thompson told her he would

Court determines that the

make

district court

a lawful arrest, Whether under

Twin

23-5050), then the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply.

23

Neimeyer under

the contents 0f the black

her for the misdemeanor Violation if she did not consent t0 the search.

3

that she

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.)

Thompson had probable cause

he threatened to do so

that

(R., p. 61.)

district court

Where

there

arrest

is

no

could not have concluded

Falls City

Code

§

6-2-6 or

contrary evidence, that ﬁnding surely establishes

by a preponderance 0f

would have done so had Neimeyer not shown him

the contents of the container.

Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787, 352 P.3d 506, 509

(Ct.

doctrine applies

When

m

the evidence that he

E

App. 2015) (“the inevitable discovery

a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the evidence discovered

pursuant to an unlawful search 0r seizure would have inevitably been discovered by lawful

methods”). Thus, the evidence supports the proposition that she would have been arrested even

if

she had not

shown

the ofﬁcers the contents of the container.

Notably, if Ofﬁcer

misdemeanor Violation
container,

any error by the

clearly harmless.

substantial rights

(Ct.

if

Thompson

she refused t0 consent to

district court in

(“Any

I.C.R. 52

n0 evidence

that

let

all,

does not affect

t0 arrest her for the

misdemeanor

the contents of the container, while at the

misdemeanor

if

if

Thompson coerced her by

that,

is

she did not

same time arguing,

in the

telling her

it

did,

to arrest

he

would have

and ofﬁcers would have conducted an

inventory search 0f the vehicle and recovered additional drugs, exactly as they did.

nothing but bare speculation

Ofﬁcer

she did not open the container.

discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia, exactly as

is

If

647

of inevitable discovery, that there

Having arrested Neimeyer on the misdemeanor, a search incident

There

Code was

then he did not falsely or erroneously

in the context

Ofﬁcer Thompson was going

to arrest her for the

Falls City

harmless Where result would have been the same).

context of her primary argument 0n appeal, that Ofﬁcer

was going

Twin

State V. Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 960, 303 P.3d 636,

Neimeyer cannot argue,

them View

arrest her for the

them View the contents of the black

taking judicial notice of the

did not threaten to arrest Neimeyer at

threaten t0 arrest her.

consent to

is

let

would

error, defect, irregularity or variance that

must be disregarded”);

App. 2013) (alleged error

Thompson

did not clearly imply that he

(R., p. 58.)

while the ofﬁcers in fact conducted a search incident

24

t0 arrest, they

Nor

is

would not have done so

if

they had instead arrested Neimeyer 0n a misdemeanor.

there anything but bare speculation that, having found the drugs in Neimeyer’s purse, they

would not have conducted an inventory search of the
The
the

district court correctly

vehicle, as they in fact did.

held that the preponderance of the evidence established that

same evidence would have been discovered even

if

Neimeyer had not consented

to the

search.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

and the denial of Neimeyer’s motion

Court t0 afﬁrm Neimeyer’s judgment 0f conviction

t0 suppress.

DATED this 5th day 0f December, 2019.
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